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 Reality Check on Offi cer Liability 
 By Lyman Johnson * and Robert Ricca ** 
This article addresses the fi duciary duties of corporate offi cers.  Responding to a critique 
that recent scholarly analyses of offi cers depart from reality, it argues that, on a variety of 
grounds, those analyses are more realistic than the critique and provide doctrinal coherence 
and advance the goal of meaningful executive accountability.  The divergent governance 
functions of directing versus managing are described and it is argued that those disparate 
roles should matter for fi duciary duty analysis.  No great outbreak of litigation should be 
expected if offi cers are held to a stricter duty of care than directors because boards of direc-
tors, not courts, likely will resolve the vast majority of disputes concerning offi cer breaches 
of duty.  The ex ante and ex post roles of fi duciary duties are emphasized, and the need for 
the Delaware legal community to more fully address more fully offi cer duties is noted, lest 
the federal government emerge as the chief regulator of senior management, a role central 
to corporate governance.
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 In the February issue of  The Business Lawyer , 1 Paul Graf broke into the halting 
conversation about offi cer liability. He argued, in essence, that Lyman Johnson 
and others have advanced an analysis of corporate offi cers that, while perhaps 
theoretically sound, “departs from reality.” 2 We welcome Mr. Graf’s voice in the 
still-unfolding development of this area of law. But in this article we argue that, for 
a number of reasons, it is Mr. Graf’s views that are unrealistic in today’s world of 
corporate life and corporate law. Adoption of his position, which we understand 
is echoed by many in the corporate community, would lead corporate law astray, 
and would serve to weaken the role of fi duciary duties both in guiding offi cers 
and sanctioning their misconduct. 
* Robert O. Bentley Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law; LeJeune 
Distinguished Chair in Law, University of St. Thomas (Minneapolis) School of Law. The Frances Lewis 
Law Center at Washington and Lee University School of Law and the University of St. Thomas (Min-
neapolis) provided fi nancial support for Professor Johnson.
** Associate, Gentry Locke Rakes & Moore, LLP (“Gentry Locke”), Roanoke, Virginia. The views 
expressed herein are the authors’ and do not necessarily represent the views of Gentry Locke or its 
partners.
The authors thank Larry Hamermesh for posing hard questions and providing helpful comments.
1. Paul Graf, A Realistic Approach to Offi cer Liability, 66 BUS. LAW. 315 (2011).
2. Id. at 321 (the “theoretical analysis departs from reality”). Mr. Graf also takes issue with certain 
points made by other thoughtful commentators, Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist Sparks III, 
Corporate Offi cers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 BUS. LAW. 865 (2005).
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 Part II of this article highlights the sharply distinct roles of directors and offi cers in 
our system of corporate governance—i.e., directing versus managing. This founda-
tional difference invites the question of whether such disparate roles should, none-
theless, result in equivalent fi duciary duties, as Mr. Graf asserts. Part III contends 
that the divergent functions of directors and offi cers should matter for fi duciary 
duty analysis. Corporate offi cers, unlike directors, are agents of the corporation, 
and therefore agency law supplies the default duties for offi cers, subject to possible 
judicial or contractual modifi cation. 
 Part IV argues that directors, not courts, likely will resolve the vast majority 
of disputes concerning offi cer breaches of duty. Consequently, there will be no 
great outbreak of litigation ex post and courts will continue, as now, to address 
far more director than offi cer cases. Moreover, for a variety of reasons we iden-
tify, a stricter standard of care for offi cers than for directors will not distort or 
have adverse effects on managerial behavior. Part V sketches the important but 
oft-neglected role that meaningful offi cer fi duciary duties can play in shaping 
offi cer conduct ex ante. Part VI explains how Mr. Graf collapses many estab-
lished distinctions in current corporate law analysis, and shows how he offers 
less a critique of offi cer liability than an unwarranted broadside against judi-
cial review of fi duciary duties more generally. Part VII concludes by describing 
how the federal government—notably the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”)—is now the chief legal regulator of offi cers, not Delaware courts or 
state corporate law. Necessarily, with widespread offi cer wrongdoing in con-
temporary business society showing no sign of abating, some legal body must 
articulate and enforce legal rules for offi cers. The question for members of the 
Delaware legal community is whether they will contribute to this enterprise or 
quit the fi eld. 3 
 II.  THE UNDENIABLY DIFFERENT GOVERNANCE 
FUNCTIONS OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 
 While serving as a corporate offi cer can lead to fame (think Jack Welch at GE, 
Steve Jobs at Apple, and Richard Branson at Virgin), or infamy (see Jeffrey Skilling 
and Andrew Fastow at Enron, Dennis Kozlowski at Tyco, Tony Hayward at BP, or 
the senior managers of the Murdoch news empire), one would be hard-pressed to 
come up with similar lists of notoriety for members of boards of directors. This 
distinction refl ects the central corporate governance role of corporate offi cers. 
Unfortunately, however, certain state legislators, judges, practitioners, and aca-
3. By “members of the Delaware legal community,” we do not mean only judges who, after all, can 
only adjudicate those cases and address those claims brought before them. We mean as well, if not 
more signifi cantly, plaintiffs’ lawyers who routinely fail to differentiate legally claims against offi cers 
from claims against directors. See Lyman Johnson & Dennis Garvis, Are Corporate Offi cers Advised 
About Fiduciary Duties?, 64 BUS. LAW. 1105, 1109 & nn.27−29 (2009) (describing the too-late effort 
of plaintiffs’ counsel in the Disney litigation to sharpen their focus on offi cers); see also infra note 118. 
We also mean corporate lawyers who may spend inadequate time counseling offi cers about fi duciary 
duties. See Johnson & Garvis, supra, at 1109–10; Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Robert V. Ricca, (Not) Advising 
Corporate Offi cers About Fiduciary Duties, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 663, 670–71 (2007).
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demics fail to appreciate the myriad substantive differences between the roles of 
corporate offi cers and directors, and instead lump offi cers and directors together 
as “management” for purposes of analyzing fi duciary duty obligations. 4 This con-
fl ation is problematic. A realistic analysis of the fi duciary duty obligations of of-
fi cers as compared to the well-established fi duciary duty obligations of directors 
requires that we fi rst acknowledge the very different governance roles of offi cers 
as compared to directors. 
 A. DIRECTING VERSUS MANAGING 
 Since it is not practical, or even possible, for the shareholders of a corporation 
with widely dispersed ownership to oversee the management of the business, the 
board of directors serves as an “intermediary” between the business owners (the 
shareholders) and the business managers (the offi cers). 5 Boards of directors en-
sure that shareholder wealth is enhanced through providing guidance on business 
strategy and through oversight and monitoring of the offi cers in their management 
of the business. 6 Mr. Graf overlooks this intermediary role of the board, assuming 
instead that boards of directors actively manage the business. 7 While corporate 
statutes provide directors with management authority, 8 in reality, given the “size 
and complexity of many modern corporations,” 9 boards of directors cannot and 
do not “manage” the business and affairs of the corporation. 10 Instead, the “norm 
in corporate America” is that the board delegates its management authority to the 
offi cers. 11 
4. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Offi cers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1597, 1599–1600 (2005).
 5. See AM. LAW INST., 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS pts. III 
& III-A (1994) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]; see also ABA CORPORATE LAWS COMM., CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S 
GUIDEBOOK 1 (6th ed. 2011) [hereinafter GUIDEBOOK].
 6. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, § 3.02(a) & cmt. d; see also GUIDEBOOK, supra note 5, at 1.
 7. Graf, supra note 1, at 319, 324–25 (“directors have primary responsibility for managing the 
corporation”); see also infra note 13 and accompanying text.
 8. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) (“the business and affairs . . . shall be managed by 
or under the direction of a board of directors”); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2011) (“the 
business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction, and subject to the 
oversight, of its board of directors”).
 9. See R. Franklin Balotti & Megan W. Shaner, Safe Harbor for Offi cer Reliance: Comparing the 
Approaches of the Model Business Corporation Act and Delaware’s General Corporation Law, 74 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 169 (2011).
10. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, § 3.02 cmt. a; see also GUIDEBOOK, supra note 5, at 2 (“The key 
challenge for directors is to oversee the corporation’s activities and strategy by utilizing effective over-
sight processes and making informed decisions, without becoming day-to-day managers.”); MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) & cmt., at 8-4 (“In some closely held corporations, the board of directors 
may be involved in the day-to-day business . . . . But in many other corporations, the business and 
affairs are managed ‘under the direction, and subject to the oversight, of’ the board of directors, since 
operational management is delegated to executive offi cers and other professional managers.”).
11. Thuy-Nga T. Vo, To Be or Not to Be Both CEO and Board Chair, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 65, 68 (2010); 
see also Johnson & Millon, supra note 4, at 1621 (“[U]ntil the early 1970s, most corporate statutes 
provided that boards of directors actually were to ‘manage’ the corporation. . . . Legal form eventually 
yielded to institutional reality for directors, as corporate statutes were amended to provide that the 
management function need only be under the board’s ‘direction.’ ” (citations omitted)).
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 In delegating its management authority, directors adopt corporate bylaws and 
approve initial board resolutions granting the offi cers vast and wide-reaching op-
erational powers. 12 Mr. Graf’s assertion that “the board controls the level of speci-
fi city of each delegation” is simply inaccurate. 13 In reality, directors only intervene 
or limit offi cer discretion on major corporate decisions, such as: change of control 
or fi nancing transactions; acquisitions and dispositions of material assets; major 
changes in plans and strategies; and changes involving accounting, fi nancial state-
ments, and internal controls and procedures. 14 Since the board only intervenes 
in management functions for major issues, the directors focus their attention on 
board oversight and monitoring functions. 15 The directors oversee and monitor 
fi nancial performance, offi cer managerial performance, compliance with legal ob-
ligations and corporate policies, and evaluation and design of appropriate risk 
management structures. 16 Perhaps the most important director oversight func-
tions include the selection and appointment of qualifi ed individuals to serve as 
the corporate offi cers, followed by the periodic evaluation of those offi cers and the 
determination of executive compensation. 17 
 With directors intervening only on major issues, the offi cers are left with pri-
mary responsibility to manage the day-to-day operations of the business. Using 
the broad delegation of authority from the board, executive offi cers “[d]etermine 
and formulate policies and provide [the] overall direction of companies.” 18 Typi-
12. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(a), 142(a)–(b) (2001); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.01(b), 8.40 
& 8.41; see also Johnson & Millon, supra note 4, at 1605 n.24. For example, see also the Massey Energy 
Company bylaws, which granted the CEO, subject to the power and authority of the board, “general 
supervision, direction and control of the offi cers, employees, business and affairs of the Corporation.” 
Massey Energy Co., Restated Bylaws (Exhibit 3.2, Form 8-K), Article IV, § 4.01 (Dec. 3, 2010), avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/37748/000119312510275690/dex32.htm.
13. Graf, supra note 1, at 319. On the other hand, Mr. Graf also raises a concern that “[i]f directors 
divest themselves of responsibility by delegating substantial discretion to offi cers without meaningful 
guidance, and then neglect to monitor the exercise of that discretion, should directors not be held ac-
countable at least to the same extent as offi cers? To do otherwise is to grant directors a license to shirk 
responsibility with impunity.” Id. at 320. We disagree with this concern; the director monitoring func-
tion is subject to well-established fi duciary duty obligations, and the standard of liability for offi cers in 
carrying out their management functions should not change those standards.
14. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, § 3.02; see also GUIDEBOOK, supra note 5, at 11; Vo, supra note 
11, at 68 n.11 (citing Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (or, Why You Don’t 
Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 18 (2003) (explaining that 
after directors select executives and employees to run daily operations, the directors intervene in daily 
operations only on major issues)).
15. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 4, at 1602; see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) & cmt., at 
8-4, 8-5; ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, § 3.02 cmt. d (“The director oversight function refers ‘to general 
observation and oversight, not active supervision or day-to-day scrutiny.’ . . . This oversight function 
is usually performed, not directly by actively supervising the principal senior executives, but indirectly 
by evaluating the performance of those executives and replacing any who are not meeting reasonable 
expectations concerning job performance.”).
16. GUIDEBOOK, supra note 5, at 11.
17. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, § 3.02(a)(1).
18. Custom Report for 11-1011-00—Chief Executives, O*NET ONLINE, http://www.onetonline.org 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2011) [hereinafter O*Net Chief Executive Report] (“chief executives” include the 
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cal functions of the offi cers include entering into ordinary business transactions, 19 
devising business strategies, 20 setting business goals, 21 managing risks, 22 and gen-
erally working with subordinates to “[p]lan, direct, or coordinate operational ac-
tivities.” 23 Clearly, these management functions of the offi cers are very different 
from the director oversight functions. 
 B.  INFORMATION, TIME, AND COMPENSATION: REAL 
REFLECTIONS OF DIVERGENT RESPONSIBILITIES 
 Offi cers and directors are further distinguished by their very different time 
commitments to the business, level of access to corporate information, and com-
pensation. These differences refl ect the divergent roles played by directors and 
offi cers in corporate governance. 
 1. Time Commitment 
 While Mr. Graf is correct that current expectations for director engagement and 
preparation are far greater than in the recent past, 24 directors still spend only a 
small fraction of the amount of time that offi cers spend in fulfi lling their respon-
“Chief Executive Offi cer (CEO), President, Chief Financial Offi cer (CFO), Vice President, Chief Op-
erating Offi cer (COO), Executive Director, Executive Vice President (EVP), Finance Vice President, 
General Manager, Operations Vice President”). The Occupational Information Network (O*Net) is 
developed under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Labor/Employment and Training Admin-
istration through a grant to the North Carolina Employment Security Commission, which operates 
the National Center for O*Net Development. About O*Net, O*NET ONLINE, http://www.onetcenter.org/
overview.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
19. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.41 cmt., at 8-64.
20. For an illustration of offi cers devising major business strategies without the involvement of 
the board of directors, consider how after executives at Goldman Sachs realized that the company’s 
“$6 billion bet on American home loans” was a potential disaster in the making, the chief fi nancial 
offi cer and three subordinate executives developed a seven-point strategy for unloading the bad debt 
and making a hefty profi t in the process. The executives turned Goldman’s $6 billion long posi-
tion into a $10 billion short position without any involvement of the company’s board of directors. 
See Matt Taibbi, The People vs. Goldman Sachs, ROLLING STONE, May 26, 2011, at 41, 43 (citing U.S. 
SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A 
FINANCIAL COLLAPSE (Apr. 13, 2011), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_fi les/Financial_Crisis/
FinancialCrisisReport.pdf ).
21. For an example of offi cers setting goals, the executive committee at Countrywide set a goal to 
achieve 30 percent market share within a fi ve-year time period. See Connie Bruck, Angelo’s Ashes, NEW 
YORKER, June 29, 2009, at 46, 50.
22. GUIDEBOOK, supra note 5, at 11.
23. O*Net Chief Executive Report, supra note 18; see also Howard Berkes, Questions Remain Year 
After W. Va. Mine Explosion, NPR (Apr. 9, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/04/09/135251710/questions-
remain-year-after-w-va-mine-explosion (for an example of an offi cer implementing corporate policy 
and working with subordinates to direct operational activities, see the memo (referenced in the article) 
from Don Blankenship, former President and CEO of Massey Energy, instructing his deep mine su-
perintendents as follows: “If any of you have been asked by your group presidents, your supervisors, 
 engineers or anyone else to do anything other than run coal (i.e.—build overcasts, do construction 
jobs, or whatever) you need to ignore them and run coal.” The article points out that “[b]uilding over-
casts is a safety function designed to improve ventilation in mines.”).
24. Graf, supra note 1, at 325.
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sibilities to the corporation. 25 Prior to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
2002, directors spent an average of fourteen hours per month on board matters. 26 
That number jumped to nineteen hours in 2003, 27 and the fi gure has hovered at 
around twenty hours per month through at least 2009. 28 Even under a conserva-
tive estimate that offi cers spend fi fty hours per week on the job, 29 that would 
be 200 hours per month, which means that offi cers spend around ten times the 
amount of time that directors spend in fulfi lling their duties to the corporation. 30 
 Serving as a director is “not a hobby,” but it is important to remember that 
most directors also hold demanding full-time jobs and serve on multiple boards 
of directors. 31 As an illustration, of the six non-management directors at Google, 
fi ve hold top-level executive positions at other entities, and the sixth is a director 
at four other large companies. 32 
 2. Compensation 
 Mr. Graf argues that non-management directors are “well compensated,” cit-
ing that “in 2009, non-management directors at General Electric Company (‘GE’) 
received average annual compensation of just over $356,000; more than half of 
that average sum [in] incentive compensation.” 33 What Mr. Graf fails to mention 
25. See infra notes 27–29.
26. See WHAT DIRECTORS THINK: CORP. BOARD MEMBER/PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS SURVEY 14 fi g. 31 
(2005 Special Supp.), available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/corporate-governance/assets/cbm-
wdt-2005.pdf.
27. Id.
28. See WHAT DIRECTORS THINK: CORP. BOARD MEMBER/PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS SURVEY 12 (2009 
Special Supp.), available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/corporate-governance/assets/what-directors-
think-2009-supplement.pdf; see also STUDY GRP. ON CORPORATE BDS., BRIDGING BOARD GAPS: REPORT OF THE 
STUDY GROUP ON CORPORATE BOARDS 56 n.8 (2011), available at http://weinbergccg.typepad.com/fi les/
fi nal-studygroup_fi nal_spreads.pdf [hereinafter BRIDGING BOARD GAPS] (citing 2010 NACD Corporate 
Governance Survey, fi nding that on average per year, directors spend 71.5 hours in meetings, 61.8 
hours reviewing reports, 36.4 hours traveling to and from meetings, 20.1 hours receiving education, 
8.6 hours representing the company (or board) at events, and 13.5 hours engaged in other activities 
related to board service. These averages are not cumulative, but add up to slightly more than 210 hours 
per year, so the 20-hour-per-month estimate from the What Directors Think survey may be high.).
29. We believe offi cers likely spend more than fi fty hours per week on the job, but we use fi fty 
hours as an estimate since empirical research on the matter is limited. However the O*Net Chief 
Executive Report, supra note 18, reports that over 90 percent of offi cers work more than forty hours 
per week. For purposes of these fi ndings, the offi cers include those with the titles listed in note 18.
30. See supra note 28 (directors spend twenty hours per month, about fi ve hours per week, fulfi ll-
ing their board duties). We think our estimates understate the differential but we are seeking to make 
a conservative comparison.
31. Graf, supra note 1, at 325; see also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LLC, ANNUAL CORPORATE DIRECTORS 
SURVEY: THE 2010 RESULTS (2010), at 31–32, available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/corporate-gover
nance/assets/annual-corporate-directors-survey-2010.pdf.
32. GOOGLE, NOTICE OF 2011 ANNUAL MEETING AND PROXY STATEMENT 11–12 (2011), available at http://
investor.google.com/proxy.html (follow “2011 Proxy Statement” hyperlink) [hereinafter GOOGLE PROXY 
STATEMENT]. The Google non-management directors include L. John Doerr, General Partner of Kleiner 
Perkins Caufi eld & Byers; John L. Hennessy, President of Stanford University; Ann Mather, a member 
of the boards of directors at Glu Mobile Inc., MBM Holdings Inc., MoneyGram International, and 
Net fl ix, Inc.; Paul S. Otellini, CEO and President of Intel Corporation; K. Ram Shriram, a managing 
partner of Sherpalo Ventures, LLC; and Shirley M. Tilghman, President of Princeton University.
33. Graf, supra note 1, at 333–34.
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is that in 2010, the GE executive offi cers received average total compensation of 
about $15.2 million each, or over fi fty times the compensation of the directors. 34 
This 50 to 1 ratio was generally consistent across the board for large public com-
panies in 2010. 35 
 Perhaps even more important in determining whether compensation provides 
similar incentives for directors and offi cers, consider that more than half of the 
directors at GE serve, or have served, as chief executives of Fortune 500 compa-
nies. 36 Put simply, serving on corporate boards is not how many directors earn 
their bread. Further to this point, consider that in 2010, average compensation 
for the GE named executive offi cers increased by 12.5 percent, 37 but average com-
pensation for the non-management directors at GE dropped by 20 percent. 38 
 3. Access to Information 
 Corporate offi cers are unquestionably better positioned to gain access to cor-
porate information than members of the board of directors. Consider the access 
to company information enjoyed by the offi cers at Google. The key managers of 
Google’s different business divisions meet in a conference room several afternoons 
each week to work as if in a “war room situation.” 39 These offi cers discuss business 
strategies and raise different issues and ideas that may come up during a regular 
business day. 40 In contrast, the Google board of directors held seven meetings and 
34. GEN. ELEC. CO., NOTICE OF 2011 ANNUAL MEETING AND PROXY STATEMENT 30 (2011), available at 
http://www.ge.com/ar2010/pdf/122802ACL.pdf [hereinafter GE PROXY STATEMENT] (CEO and Chair-
man Jeffrey Immelt topped the list of GE named executive offi cers in 2010 with total compensation of 
$21.4 million, while the other four named executive offi cers received total compensation of between 
$12.8 and $14.3 million.).
35. Average compensation for chief executives was nearly $12 million in 2010, while median 
compensation for non-management directors was $228,540. See Pay Up: Overpaid Bosses Are Back, 
ECONOMIST, June 18, 2011, at 74 (citing GovernanceMetrics International (GMI) for the information on 
chief executive compensation); see Lou Taormina, 2010 Director Compensation: NASDAQ 100 vs. NYSE 
100, FREDERIC W. COOK & CO., INC. 2 (Aug. 2010), http://www.fwcook.com/alert_letters/2010_Di-
rector_Compensation_NASDAQ_100_vs_NYSE_100_Non-Employee_Director_Compensation_at_
the_100_Largest_NASDAQ_and_100_Largest_New_York_Stock_Exchange_Companies.pdf (fi nding 
that the median total value of director compensation increased from $205,000 in 2009 to $228,540 
in 2010). Median compensation for chief fi nancial offi cers at S&P 500 companies for 2010 was $2.9 
million, many times the median pay for non-executive directors. James Willhite, Pay Tally Up 19% for 
Finance Chiefs,WALL ST. J., June 30, 2011, at B1.
36. GE PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 34, at 11–16.
37. Id. at 30 (average total compensation for the named executive offi cers in 2009 was $13.5 
million).
38. Id. at 44; see also GEN. ELEC. CO., NOTICE OF 2010 ANNUAL MEETING AND PROXY STATEMENT 40 (2010), 
available at http://www.ge.com/pdf/investors/fi nancial_reporting/proxy_statements/ge_proxy_2010.
pdf (total compensation per GE director dropped from $356,000 in 2009 to $296,335 in 2010); see 
also supra note 35 (discussing the more than 11 percent increase in pay for non-management directors 
of large public companies in 2010).
39. Life ‘In The Plex’: The Future of Google, NPR (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.npr.org/templates/tran
script/transcript.php?storyId=135023714 (transcript of National Public Radio Morning Edition with 
Renee Montagne, interviewing Steven Levy, author of In the Plex: How Google Thinks, Works, and Shapes 
Our Lives).
40. Id.
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acted by written consent four times in 2010. 41 The Google offi cers likely spend 
more time together in a month than the directors spend together all year. 
 While conceding that directors are not in as frequent contact with corporate 
information, Mr. Graf counters that directors can “demand access to any informa-
tion that they may deem necessary to fulfi ll their managing and monitoring du-
ties.” 42 However, the ability to demand information cannot put the directors in the 
same position as offi cers. Any information provided to directors is either created 
by the offi cers or produced under the direction of the offi cers. 43 Further, directors 
often cannot dedicate the same amount of time as the offi cers to reviewing or fol-
lowing up on this information, and even if they did, offi cers have “fi rm-specifi c fa-
miliarity with the details of the particular companies they manage,” which makes 
the information much more meaningful to those offi cers. 44 
 State corporate statutes recognize the informational gap between the offi cers 
and directors, and thus protect directors from personal liability for actions taken 
in reliance on information provided by offi cers. 45 Renowned Delaware lawyer 
R. Franklin Balotti and Megan W. Shaner argue that “[b]ecause directors are enti-
tled to such protection, offi cers should arguably be held to a strict standard of care 
and requirement to be fully informed.” 46 This statutory treatment allowing direc-
tors to rely on information from the offi cers refl ects that offi cers have much greater 
access to and understanding of corporate information, and also is a testament to 
the different roles and functions of the offi cers as compared to the directors. 
 C. THE CENTRAL ROLE OF OFFICERS 
 Overlooking the stark differences noted above, Mr. Graf fails to acknowl-
edge the reality that corporate offi cers, not directors, occupy the central role 
in corporate governance. Of the three main actors in corporate governance 
(shareholders, directors, and offi cers), the offi cers clearly continue to reign su-
preme. 47 Shareholders are more likely to sell their shares than try to effect cor-
porate change, 48 while, distressingly, directors tend to consider the CEO to be 
the “boss.” 49 
41. GOOGLE PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 32, at 14, 16–17. The Google Audit Committee also met six 
times, the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee met fi ve times, and the Leadership De-
velopment and Compensation Committee met fi ve times. The Audit and Nominating and Corporate 
Governance Committees did not act by written consent during 2010, but the Leadership Development 
and Compensation Committee acted by written consent twenty-fi ve times.
42. Graf, supra note 1, at 323.
43. “Boards only know what the CEO and CFO tell them. Nothing more.” BRIDGING BOARD GAPS, 
supra note 28, at 20 (quoting Richard Beattie, Chairman of Simpson, Thacher and Bartlett LLP).
44. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 4, at 1618.
45. Balotti & Shaner, supra note 9, at 172 & n.45 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(d)–(f )).
46. Id. at 172.
47. See Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Restoring the Balance of Power in Corporate Management: Enforc-
ing an Offi cer’s Duty of Obedience, 66 BUS. LAW. 27, 51 (2010).
48. Id. at 51 n.153 (“Our vast and highly liquid fi nancial markets enable large institutional share-
holders to sell their shares when they perceive inadequacies of corporate governance, rather than 
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 An illustration of this central role of the offi cer is found amidst the global furor 
prompted by the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. Following the spill, Tony Hayward, then 
chief executive of BP, was dubbed America’s “most hated” and “clueless” man, 50 
and was under such intense pressure from the media and general public that he 
was forced to resign. 51 The BP board members, by contrast, including the chair-
man Carl-Henric Svanberg, were spared such treatment and retained their board 
seats. 
 Similarly, consider how offi cers were at the heart of the economic scandals in 
the early 2000s and more recently with the global fi nancial crisis. 52 Or consider 
how successful chief executives like Steve Jobs and Mark Zuckerberg are under 
the constant glare of the media spotlight. Offi cers, not directors, occupy center 
stage because offi cer performance is crucial to the success or failure of the compa-
nies these offi cers run and to the economy as a whole. 53 
 Mr. Graf ignores this central role of the offi cer, going so far as to argue that 
enforcing offi cer fi duciary duties would be inappropriate because it would be dif-
fi cult to defi ne who the “offi cers” are for purposes of fi duciary duty liability. 54 Curi-
ously, in two pages of discussion about how diffi cult it would be to defi ne whether 
someone is an “offi cer,” 55 Mr. Graf fails to mention that Delaware’s long-arm stat-
ute provides an explicit defi nition of the term for purposes of taking jurisdiction 
over such offi cers in the Delaware courts. 56 The Delaware General Corporation 
Law (“DGCL”) and the Model Business Corporation Act (“MBCA”) also provide 
fi x them. This has placed de facto control in the hands of the chief executive offi cer.” (quoting Excerpts 
from Report by Greenspan at Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002, at C8)).
49. Id. at 51 & n.154 (citing Johnson & Millon, supra note 4, at 1613–14). The widespread prac-
tice of the CEO also serving as chairperson of the board of directors enhances this problem because 
the most infl uential member of the board of directors is also the most senior offi cer that must be 
monitored.
50. Helen Kennedy, BP’s CEO Tony Hayward: The Most Hated—and Most Clueless—Man in Amer-
ica, N.Y. DAILY NEWS “June 3, 2010,” available at http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-06-03/news/
27065997_1_bp-brand-lord-john-browne-british-oil.
51. Rowena Mason, BP’s Tony Hayward Resigns After Being “Demonised and Vilifi ed” in the US, TELE-
GRAPH ( July 27, 2010, 12:42 PM BST), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/fi nance/newsbysector/energy/oil
andgas/7912338/BPs-Tony-Hayward-resigns-after-being-demonised-and-vilifi ed-in-the-US.html.
52. See Shaner, supra note 47, at 28, 50; see also Johnson & Garvis, supra note 3, at 1105–06.
53. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 4, at 1599.
54. Graf, supra note 1, at 335 (“If Delaware courts decide to impose a form of offi cer liability, it is 
incumbent on the courts to specify precisely which offi cers are at risk for personal liability, and how 
they can be identifi ed.”)
55. Id. at 334–35.
56. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114(b) (2010) (“[T]he word ‘offi cer’ means an offi cer of the cor-
poration who (i) is or was the president, chief executive offi cer, chief operating offi cer, chief fi nancial 
offi cer, chief legal offi cer, controller, treasurer or chief accounting offi cer of the corporation at any time 
during the course of conduct alleged in the action or proceeding to be wrongful, (ii) is or was identi-
fi ed in the corporation’s public fi lings with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission be-
cause such person is or was [one] of the most highly compensated executive offi cers of the corporation 
at any time during the course of conduct alleged in the action or proceeding to be wrongful, or (iii) 
has, by written agreement with the corporation, consented to be identifi ed as an offi cer for purposes 
of this section.”); see also Gantler v. Stephens, C.A. No. 2392-VCP, 2008 WL 401124, at *7 (Del. Ch. 
Feb. 14, 2008). The Delaware Court of Chancery applied the long-arm statute’s defi nition of “offi cer” 
in the Gantler v. Stephens line of cases.
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that corporations may have such “offi cers” as are named in the bylaws or approved 
by the board of directors in accordance with those bylaws. 57 Clearly, holding one 
of these enumerated offi cer positions will subject an individual to personal juris-
diction in state courts. Determination of who is an “offi cer” in a particular public 
corporation should not be diffi cult, given this authoritative guidance. 
 III. MODELING THE OFFICER’S ROLE: AGENCY THEORY AS REALITY 
 We believe that the divergent roles played by directors and offi cers in corporate 
governance should matter for fi duciary duty analysis. We believe too that agency 
law principles serve to illuminate further the differences while also supplying the 
default rules for offi cer duties. 
 Mr. Graf concedes, as he must, that corporate offi cers are agents of the corpora-
tion. 58 But he considers their agency status to be “an unpersuasive technicality,” 59 
and he believes that offi cers should not be treated “exactly like other agents.” 60 
The agency status of corporate offi cers in law is clear, 61 just as it is equally clear 
that corporate directors typically are not agents. 62 As stated by the Delaware Su-
preme Court in  Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc . 63 : 
 Directors, in the ordinary course of their service as directors, do not act as agents of 
the corporation. . . . It would be an analytical anomaly, therefore, to treat corporate 
directors as  agents of the corporation when they are acting as  fi duciaries of the stock-
holders in managing the business and affairs of the corporation. 64 
 Directors, in other words, oversee the interests of the corporation, an organi-
zation that is a legal but artifi cial entity unable by itself to advance and protect 
its own interests. Acting on behalf of the corporations they serve 65 —not their 
own behalf—directors do for those companies exactly what many individual 
persons do: employ agents. Chief among those persons so engaged by a corpo-
ration are executive offi cers. When they act for the corporation, such offi cers 
clearly are agents of the corporate principal, deployed as such by the directors, 
who themselves represent the inanimate corporation’s interests. In this way, we 
see yet again the quite different functions and corresponding legal statuses of 
57. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (2001); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.40(a) (2011).
58. Graf, supra note 1, at 326 (“Offi cers are agents.”).
59. Id. at 317, 327.
60. Id. at 326.
61. See, e.g., Johnson & Millon, supra note 4, at 1605–06 & n.27.
62. Id. at 1605 & n.25, 1620.
63. 678 A.2d 533 (Del. 1996).
64. Id. at 539–40.
65. Graf believes this straightforward arrangement, standard in business organizations, presents 
a “theoretical quagmire.” Graf, supra note 1, at 327. Keeping in mind that, under modern corporate 
statutes and business necessity, directors of public companies oversee but do not manage the business 
and affairs of the corporation, the relationship of directors and offi cers, in practice and theory, is quite 
clear. Directors act on behalf of the company (the principal) to hire offi cers who become managing 
agents of the company, not agents of the directors. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 4, at 1648–49. 
Equating directors and offi cers as “managers” muddies the governance relationship.
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directors and offi cers in corporate governance. Directors are not, but offi cers 
are, agents. 
 Agency law therefore provides a pre-existing set of expectations and principles 
that, unlike the case with directors, does not require “starting from scratch” in 
modeling the offi cer’s role in corporate governance. Moreover, an agency relation-
ship is inherently fi duciary in character and it is consensual, but contrary to Mr. 
Graf’s assertion, 66 it can arise independently of contract. 67 Given the agency status 
of executive offi cers, the key question is whether a core feature of agency law— 
 fi duciary duties—also will be adopted by corporate law or, instead, will be modi-
fi ed in some fashion to achieve particular policy goals. We make several brief points 
here in this regard and refer the reader to other scholarship for fuller treatment. 68 
 First, since executive offi cers undoubtedly are agents, the default and baseline 
standard for the fi duciary duties they owe should be drawn from agency law, 69 the 
body of law traditionally governing that subject. Those who fi nd this objection-
able, for whatever reason, must make a compelling case as to why these standard 
default rules, including the generally applicable standard of “normal” or ordinary 
care, 70 do not apply to offi cers. Of course, a key element of making such a case 
is to state convincingly why the quite different functions of offi cers and direc-
tors in corporate governance—sketched in Part II above—are of no signifi cance 
on the fi duciary duty issue. We think it is incumbent on Mr. Graf and others to 
demonstrate persuasively why, when it comes to default fi duciary duties, offi cers 
uniquely are  not “exactly like other agents.” 71 
 Second, there is no obvious reason why an organizational principal, such as 
a corporation, should expect or be entitled to a lower standard of care (or other 
duties) from its agents than that expected by individual principals, whose expecta-
tions clearly are provided by the precepts of agency law. 72 If anything, the monitor-
ing of agents by an organizational principal is more challenging than monitoring 
by an individual principal and, on that ground, a stricter not looser standard 
should be owed. Third, doubts about equating directors and offi cers for personal 
liability purposes have long existed in Delaware, dating back at least to the legis-
lative decision not to include offi cers within the exculpation coverage of section 
66. Graf, supra note 1, at 328 (“agency is a contractual relationship”).
67. DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCS: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 117 n.2 (2d 
ed. 2002) (stating “an agent typically owes duties in contract as well as under agency law”); see also 
GAB Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Lindsey & Newsom Claim Servs., Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 665, 670 (Ct. App. 
2000) (noting that fi duciary duties of offi cers arise independently of contract).
68. See generally Johnson & Millon, supra note 4; see also Lyman Johnson, Having the Fiduciary Duty 
Talk: Model Advice for Corporate Offi cers (and Other Senior Agents), 63 BUS. LAW. 147, 148–52 (2007).
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01–8.12 (2006).
70. Id. § 8.08 (“Subject to any agreement with the principal, an agent has a duty to the principal 
to act with the care, competence, and diligence normally exercised by agents in similar circumstances. 
Special skills or knowledge possessed by an agent are circumstances to be taken into account in deter-
mining whether the agent acted with due care and diligence. If an agent claims to possess special skills 
or knowledge, the agent has a duty to the principal to act with the care, competence, and diligence 
normally exercised by agents with such skills or knowledge.”).
71. Graf, supra note 1, at 326.
72. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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102(b)(7), as was done for directors. 73 This refl ects an acknowledged difference 
between the responsibilities of offi cers and directors that has endured for twenty-
fi ve years. Although in 2009 the Delaware Supreme Court equated director and 
offi cer duties in general terms, 74 it did not resolve a host of other issues pertaining 
to corporate offi cers, including the precise standard of care for offi cers. 75 
 Finally, as the corporate law community grapples with the emerging law of 
corporate offi cers, we should be careful not to apply automatically concerns about 
overly strict director liability standards to offi cers. The modern director care stan-
dard has settled at the gross negligence level, 76 and in Delaware directors can be 
exculpated from personal liability for breaching the duty of care. 77 These move-
ments toward greater personal protection for directors were grounded in real, if 
still debatable, concerns about a rash of costly litigation and a perceived unwill-
ingness of many persons to serve on corporate boards or take appropriate business 
risks without enhanced immunity. But do these concerns demonstrably apply to 
offi cers? Will we see an upsurge in litigation against offi cers, an unwillingness to 
occupy the executive suite, and other adverse effects if offi cers are held to the cus-
tomary standard of care for all other agents, which is only somewhat stricter than 
that for directors? The next part argues that such an outcome is highly unlikely. 
 IV.  DIRECTORS, NOT COURTS, ADDRESS MOST OFFICER 
WRONGDOING; UNLIKELY ADVERSE EFFECTS OF 
OFFICER ACCOUNTABILITY 
 Corporate directors, owing fi duciary duties of care and loyalty, face the prospect 
of being sued by shareholders, either directly or derivatively, for breaching their 
duties. 78 Of course, to initiate a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation itself, 
shareholders must plead that a demand on the board to begin litigation would 
73. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001 & Supp. 2010). Another difference in Delaware is the 
statutory right of directors to rely on others. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
74. See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009).
75. Johnson & Garvis, supra note 3, at 1108. Professor Johnson and Dennis Garvis, writing in 
2009, described the open issues after Gantler as follows:
[W]hether and how the business judgment rule applies to offi cers in Delaware remains unclear. 
Moreover, the court in Gantler addressed the duty of loyalty issue, not the duty of care issue. 
Also, the case did not involve offi cer oversight responsibilities. Thus, we continue to lack clear 
guidance as to the scope and reach of offi cer duties of care and good faith. Relatedly, the Delaware 
Supreme Court also did not address the ordinary negligence versus gross negligence standard in 
the care context, as the issue was not before it. Finally, given rather signifi cant differences in the 
roles and responsibilities of directors and offi cers within corporate governance, the court did not 
explain the reason for equating their fi duciary duties. Clearly the area of offi cer duties remains 
murkier than that of director duties.
Id.
76. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
77. See supra note 73 (Delaware’s director exculpation statute).
78. Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004) (“Whether a 
stockholder’s claim is derivative or direct . . . must turn solely on the following questions: (1) who 
suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually); and (2) who 
would receive the benefi t of any recovery or other remedy (the corporation or the stockholders, 
individually)?”).
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be futile. 79 Even if a derivative claim is rightly commenced without a pre-suit 
demand, a properly functioning special committee can move to dismiss the claim 
if the committee believes doing so is in the best interests of the corporation. 80 At 
the root of the law and practice of derivative litigation is the recognition that the 
claim is an asset of the corporation itself and, therefore, it is presumptively subject 
to control by the board or a board committee. 
 With respect to claims of wrongdoing by offi cers this is even more obviously 
the case. If offi cers are conceived of as agents of the corporation, their misconduct 
wrongs the company and creates a legal claim belonging  to the corporation, just 
as, conversely, their conduct as agents toward third parties can create liability  for 
the corporation. 81 Even those persons who reject an agency conception of offi cers, 
however, would have to agree that offi cer conduct damaging to the company itself 
creates a corporate derivative claim, not a direct claim. 82 Thus, indisputably, the 
board of directors, not stockholders, would be the appropriate body for address-
ing such claims. The exception would be those claims that are pursued in bank-
ruptcy court where the trustee in bankruptcy would exercise control over claims 
against offi cers, but even those actions would be assets of the corporate estate. 
 With boards of directors controlling most claims against offi cers, we think there 
will be relatively few lawsuits initiated by directors against offi cers. We expect 
that most offi cer misconduct coming to the attention of the board will be resolved 
as part of an intra-corporate sanction, whether that sanction be discharge, repri-
mand, compensation adjustment, demotion, or delayed promotion. 83 Those of-
fi cers who leave employment frequently receive severance payments, 84 and those 
exit packages likely also entail the mutual release of all claims. Directors, more-
79. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 818.
80. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonaldo, 430 A.2d 779, 785–86, 788 (Del. 1981).
81. Under a variety of theories—e.g., actual or apparent authority—a corporation can be held le-
gally responsible for an offi cer’s actions. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.01–2.04 (2006).
82. We do not rule out the possibility that certain kinds of claims against offi cers might be charac-
terized as direct claims. Briefl y, we make a few points on a subject that warrants more attention. First, 
claims against an executive who also serves on the board of directors must differentiate wrongdoing as 
an offi cer from wrongdoing in director capacity. Second, direct claims against offi cers are most likely 
to arise in signifi cant transactions such as mergers and acquisitions where a senior offi cer is attending, 
by delegation, to what is ultimately a board-level function that bears directly on a shareholder’s inter-
est as a shareholder. Third, permitting direct suits against offi cers is not inconsistent with an agency 
theory of offi cers. Rather, such claims involve those actions by offi cers, acting on behalf of corpora-
tions, which directly bear on the interest of a shareholder as a shareholder. Of course, both direct and 
derivative claims can arise from a single transaction. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996). 
With respect to public corporations at least, we expect that the vast majority of claims against offi cers 
will be derivative in nature.
83. For some reason, Graf states that Professor Johnson “bypasses the reality that offi cers face 
immediate expulsion by the board for reckless conduct.” Graf, supra note 1, at 333. Yet Graf’s own 
footnote 99 quotes from scholarship by Professor Johnson that recognizes that the board may pursue 
“an intra-fi rm sanction.” Id. at 337 n.99. Moreover, Johnson and Mark Sides, writing in 2004, stated 
that “boards may negotiate settlements with offi cers as part of an intra-corporate sanction, whether 
that be discharge, reprimand, compensation adjustment, demotion, or delayed promotion.” Lyman 
P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1149, 1207–08 (2004); see also Johnson & Millon, supra note 4, at 1611.
84. Johnson & Millon, supra note 4, at 1611 n.57 (describing Conference Board study that 
62 percent of executives who left because of major violations of ethics and compliance codes received 
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over, are in a position to negotiate a tougher exit arrangement if they invoke offi cer 
breaches of duty as leverage in departure discussions. Such breaches of duty, of 
course, operate independently of employment contracts. Too often, directors and 
their counsel may narrowly focus only on the terms of an offi cer’s employment 
agreement, forgetting that fi duciary duties transcend such agreements. Whether 
used as a negotiating lever or not, fi duciary duty claims against executives likely 
are “settled up” at the departure stage and therefore will not be litigated. This 
probably refl ects the pattern followed by most disappointed principals, the major-
ity of whom likely discharge, rather than sue, wrongdoing agents. Consequently, 
judges will rarely have to make the determination as to whether an offi cer did or 
did not behave negligently. And in those infrequent cases that are pressed, judges 
will understand that the directors (or bankruptcy trustee) believe these cases to be 
of special importance to the corporation’s best interests. 
 Appreciating the institutional reality of how (and where) most claims against 
corporate offi cers will be handled helps us see that the examples posed by 
Mr. Graf on the top of page 322 of his article are not as diffi cult to resolve as he 
believes. 85 We think that all of Mr. Graf’s examples do reveal inexcusable care-
lessness, especially the third and fourth instances. One should not be “unduly 
swayed” in introducing a new product when “additional research” would reveal 
fl aws, and “neglecting” a criminal background check when hiring for a position of 
trust is unacceptably careless. But people in organizations face those and countless 
other situations and challenges every day, and many of us make mistakes. Mis-
takes rarely lead to discharge, however, or even to other lesser sanctions. This is 
not because offi cers should be under any illusion, as Mr. Graf contends, 86 that they 
do not face monetary damages for negligence, but for at least three other reasons. 
 First, it is ineffi cient for any principal to try to detect/prevent all carelessness 
or wrongdoing and to pursue legal claims for all such behavior. Much behavior 
that is below standard simply and sensibly goes by the board, either because it is 
a fi nancial package). Increasingly, executives negotiate severance agreements long before actual de-
parture. A recent study found that in 2007 more than 55 percent of S&P 500 fi rms had awarded top 
executives severance contracts as part of their overall compensation package. Peggy Huang, Marital 
Prenups? A Look at CEO Severance Agreements 1 (Mar. 15, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1786540 
(follow “One-Click Download” hyperlink). The study found that the median CEO severance payment 
averaged about $7 million. Id. Professor Huang also found that fi rms with such severance arrange-
ments experienced signifi cant underperformance in their future stock returns. Id. at 4. Use of cash 
rather than equity as the form of payment worsened the performance. Id. For purposes of our work, 
Professor Huang further found that cash payment severance contracts induce CEOs to take excess 
risks—the payments essentially representing “put” options—while equity element severance contracts 
signifi cantly lessen excess risk-taking behavior. Id. at 5. The point is that executive compensation ap-
pears to infl uence executive behavior, from a risk standpoint.
85. See Graf, supra note 1, at 322.
86. Id. (“Offi cers believe the maximum penalty for neglectful conduct in fulfi lling job responsibili-
ties is disciplinary action or expulsion, not monetary damages.”). This lack of knowledge on the part 
of offi cers—if true—is one reason why legal counsel should regularly advise offi cers of their fi duciary 
duties. See Johnson, supra note 68, at 152–56 (offering succinct model advice designed for this pur-
pose). Limited empirical work suggests that both inside and outside legal counsel do not routinely 
advise offi cers about their duties. Johnson & Ricca, supra note 3, at 669–78; Johnson & Garvis, supra 
note 3, at 1119–20.
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undetected or because it is deliberately left unsanctioned. Second, the standard 
is reasonable conduct, not perfect conduct, even under a negligence standard. 
Mr. Graf repeatedly and wrongly sets up a straw man in stating that offi cers should 
not have to have “all” information before they act 87 —no one says they do. They, 
like directors, 88 need only have the information that is “reasonably available,” al-
though as noted in Part II, it is reasonable to expect that offi cers will have access 
to more information than directors. Both boards and courts should take account 
of imperfect information, time pressures, the signifi cance of a matter, and a range 
of factors pertinent to the particular circumstances faced by the offi cer in a specifi c 
position. A review of the pertinent legal standard for agents reveals, not surpris-
ingly, that an agent is expected to act only with the care, competence, and dili-
gence “normally exercised” by similar agents in “similar circumstances.” 89 This, as 
always with fi duciary duty analysis, is a context and position-sensitive measure. 
An offi cer therefore will be held only to the normal “community” standard for 
such an offi cer. Moreover, the range of relevant considerations for offi cers, being 
more complex than for directors, who act only episodically, likely will lead to a 
fair bit of running room for offi cers under such a “normally exercised” standard. It 
is true, as Mr. Graf rightly contends, 90 that making negligence determinations can 
be challenging for a court, but by no means is that unique to the corporate setting. 
Nor is it a reason to give offi cers a lifetime free pass for such behavior, unlike other 
agents or negligent wrongdoers. 
 Third, as to the substance or merits of the business decision made, the substan-
tive protection of the business judgment rule should be fully available to offi cers. 91 
We merely (but importantly) contend that the duty of care for offi cers should be 
the ordinary and “normally exercised” care standard, not the looser gross negli-
gence standard applicable to directors. We have not ever argued for depriving of-
fi cers of the substantive protections of the business judgment rule for an offi cer’s 
business decisions, only that the rule’s protection should not sweep as broadly for 
offi cers as for directors on the duty of care aspect. 
 We recognize that, although offi cers are agents, their position and centrality in 
corporate governance distinguishes them from other agents in certain ways that, 
if anything, should reinforce deference to their substantive judgments. First, given 
their vast discretion and the very broad delegation of power from the board, ex-
ecutive offi cers infrequently are constrained by the “duty of obedience” that may 
more typically rein in an agent operating under closer supervision by a principal. 92 
Lawyers and real estate agents, for example, however much professional latitude 
they have as to  how they perform, typically have a client providing instructions 
as to  what should be accomplished. Second, and relatedly, the board of directors 
87. Graf, supra note 1, at 323 (“all of the relevant information”), 329 (“all information”).
88. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del. 1994).
89. See supra note 70.
90. Graf, supra note 1, at 328.
91. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Offi cers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 452 
(2005).
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.09 (2006) (duty to “comply with all lawful instructions”).
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acting for the company, unlike other principals, typically communicates corporate 
goals in a very broad manner, perhaps expressing them in such metrics as profi t-
ability, market share, and growth. What course of action or strategies to be taken 
to achieve those goals is largely up to senior management, however. This means 
discretion over the substance of business decisions lies primarily with the agent, 
not the principal. There is little basis for holding someone liable for a substan-
tive decision that deliberately was left to them to make in the fi rst place. Third, 
executive offi cers operate in all industries. Unlike agents operating in particular 
industries, again such as lawyers (whatever their fi eld) and real estate agents, 
where norms as to particular advisable substantive actions may develop, it would 
seem extraordinarily diffi cult, and contrary to the dynamic nature of business, to 
expect the same for managers. Consequently, the duty of care for offi cers must es-
sentially be a process-oriented duty, though we emphasize again that the standard 
of “normally exercised” care means that courts can be expected to look to prevail-
ing practices for guidance. 
 We also think that two additional points should be made as to possible effects 
of a stricter liability standard for offi cers than directors. First, Mr. Graf speculates 
that holding offi cers to the conventional agency standard of care would lead 
them to engage in a variety of dysfunctional behavior. 93 He conjectures that of-
fi cers would seek to defl ect responsibility, engage in scapegoating, and play it 
safe. 94 Whether this is true or not ultimately is an empirical question. We con-
tinue to think, however, that those concerns are implausible and a bit far-fetched. 
Offi cers do not climb the corporate ladder in a healthy business by engaging in 
such behavior. Successful executive offi cers, moreover, tend to be confi dent, de-
termined, creative risk-takers who likely would not “play it safe,” if only because 
that conduct leads to obscurity and fewer rewards such as higher pay, promotion, 
and career mobility. And being careful, we emphasize, is not the same as not tak-
ing business risks. One can follow a sensible decision-making approach prior to 
undertaking ventures that carry quite signifi cant business risk. Furthermore, by 
Mr. Graf ’s own reckoning, 95 liability concerns are not demonstrable motivators in 
the executive suite. If anything, perhaps a bit more executive concern and law-
yerly advice about liability would curb improper conduct. 96 Our legal system’s 
typical response to unacceptable behavior is to clamp down on it, not contend 
that the very effort of doing so might lead to post hoc fi nger-pointing by wrong-
doers. The extent of scapegoating after the fact of wrongdoing, moreover, would 
seem to have little relationship to the standard of conduct applicable to a wrong-
doer; intentional and reckless actors can likely “scapegoat” as well as others. 
And if dysfunctional behavior were repeatedly engaged in, as Mr. Graf fears, the 
offi cer’s superior offi cer, or the board itself, should act. This is precisely where 
high-functioning directors are so essential. They likely would not long tolerate 
93. Graf, supra note 1, at 321, 336.
94. Id.
95. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 86.
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recurrent scapegoating or any other conduct not geared toward innovative busi-
ness growth and profi t enhancement; conduct inimical to attaining those goals 
likely would be ordered to stop or the offi cer rightly threatened with discharge. 
 Second, Mr. Graf contends that holding offi cers to the customary agency stan-
dard of care would result in “uninsulated exposure to unlimited liability.” 97 We 
doubt this as well. As noted above, we believe relatively few cases would even go 
to litigation. Moreover, all other agents in this country operate under such a stan-
dard and we do not observe a widespread outcry over agency law’s longstanding 
adoption of “unlimited” liability. And offi cers, where appropriate, would enjoy the 
usual protections of indemnifi cation, advancement of expenses, D&O insurance, 
and, possibly, negotiated modifi cations of the care standard, about which we say 
more below. But it is important to corporate law and society that offi cers face—
and know ex ante that they face—the prospect of judgment and the accountability 
and shame that accompanies signifi cant misuse of power, even if monetary liabil-
ity is reimbursed in some way. 
 In short, we are highly doubtful that a stricter (but conventional) standard of 
care for full-time offi cers than for part-time directors will lead to very much litiga-
tion, widespread liability, or dysfunctional conduct by offi cers. It may, however, 
serve a useful ex ante function if it is properly communicated. 
 V. THE EX ANTE ROLE OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
 Recent empirical work suggests that lawyers do a better job of advising direc-
tors about fi duciary duties than in advising offi cers. 98 Certainly the usual focus 
on fi duciary duties is to emphasize their role as an ex post sanctioning and risk 
allocation device in litigation. This aspect receives the most attention and com-
mentary, though an offi cer-specifi c focus is sorely lacking in traditional corporate 
law materials. We know far less about the role of fi duciary duties in shaping or 
altering director or offi cer conduct beforehand. It might be very informative to 
study both directors and senior management to learn what they actually know 
about fi duciary duties—as opposed to what lawyers say they tell their clients—
and, somewhat more challenging, to determine how their understanding does or 
does not factor into their decision making. 
 We have developed elsewhere the reasons why providing an  a priori under-
standing of fi duciary duties by offi cers is advisable. 99 Among these reasons are to 
inform offi cers that their behavior must adhere to legal standards separate and 
apart from what is set forth in their employment agreements, and that failure to 
adhere to those standards can result in sanctions, whether imposed in court or via 
the intra-corporate sanctions noted earlier. 100 Here, it suffi ces to say, in response to 
Mr. Graf, that fi duciary duties are not simply liability  rules to be invoked ex post 
 97. Graf, supra note 1, at 321.
 98. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 3, at 670–74; Johnson & Garvis, supra note 3, at 1112–17.
 99. Johnson & Ricca, supra note 3, at 665, 668, 678–92.
100. See supra Part IV.
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in litigation. The duties of care and loyalty are affi rmative, overarching  standards , 
broadly phrased as such to serve the salutary purpose of reminding executive 
offi cers that in all their endeavors the primary focus is not to be their own self-
interest or goals, but the best interests of the company. This may or may not alter 
behavior—empirically, we do not know—but it seems hard to believe that compa-
nies and their stockholders would be worse off if senior managers were regularly 
reminded by counsel that they should comply with the legal and social norms of 
loyalty and care and competence, which is what, reduced to their essence, such 
duties demand. 
 VI. MISUNDERSTANDING CURRENT DUTIES 
 Much of Mr. Graf’s article reads less like an argument against meaningful offi cer 
liability than a larger rejection of serious judicial review of fi duciary misconduct 
more generally. Moreover, Mr. Graf seems rather fundamentally to misunderstand 
what role the duty of care plays in corporate law, and he seeks to radically alter 
established analysis of that duty. 
 Current decisional law in Delaware is clear that, for directors at least, the duty 
of “care in the decision-making context is  process due care only.” 101 There is no 
“substance” to a court’s review of due care. 102 Mr. Graf would jettison this bedrock 
tenet, stating: “Judicial restraint in reviewing substantive decisions should apply 
equally to process decisions as to substantive decisions.” 103 And: “Judges should 
limit the scope of their review of corporate decision making, whether of the ul-
timate decision or the process used to arrive at that decision.” 104 The reason for 
doing so, according to Mr. Graf, is that all judicial review suffers from hindsight 
bias and “rationality is in the eye of the beholder.” 105 He posits, without support, 
that the line between process failures and substantive business decisions makes 
only theoretical, not practical, sense. 106 In place of existing duty of care doctrine, 
he believes that only reckless or intentional misconduct should be actionable, and 
then, based on the duty of loyalty. 107 And, in the name of “clarity,” “the duty of care 
should be subsumed under the duty of loyalty.” 108 
 Briefl y, we make several points about these ill-advised suggestions for doctrinal 
change. First, as noted above, most wrongdoing by offi cers will be handled inter-
nally by the board, whether rooted in a care or loyalty breach. Judges will make 
relatively few rulings on offi cers but these rulings are essential to exposit the law 
and, occasionally at least, expose to public scrutiny (and judicial comment) egre-
gious misbehavior. Second, for liability purposes the gross negligence standard for 
101. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).
102. Id.
103. Graf, supra note 1, at 336.
104. Id. at 337.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 329.
107. Id. at 336.
108. Id. at 337.
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directors already has been interpreted, in essence, as reckless indifference. 109 The 
duty of care for directors gives wide berth but it remains analytically distinct from 
the duty of loyalty. Third, the duty of care for both directors and offi cers remains 
meaningful for injunctive relief purposes, and should remain so by not watering it 
down further. Fourth, as a standard of conduct the duty of care is not merely an ex 
post liability rule; it is also designed to have an ex ante effect on deterring miscon-
duct and guiding behavior for directors and offi cers. To eviscerate it is to remove 
this salutary benefi t. Fifth, the process/substance distinction is foundational to 
judicial review of care. It represents the basic fi rebreak between a fi duciary duty—
i.e., care—and the business judgment doctrine—i.e., that courts do not, in the 
care setting at least, make substantive business decisions. Attention to process is 
something courts are institutionally equipped to address, unlike second-guessing 
substantive business judgments. Moreover, emphasizing sound process in cor-
porate decision making is grounded in the widespread belief in our legal system 
(think due process here) that we are more likely to get better substantive outcomes 
if the appropriate decision maker is accountable for  how it makes a decision even 
if it is not accountable for  what the decision is. Surely, fl ipping a coin is no way 
to decide whether or not to pursue a merger, for example, or whether a criminal 
defendant should be jailed, even if in retrospect the “right” decision was made. 
Mr. Graf would scrap that rationale in his quite radical proposal to expunge the duty 
of care from corporate law, even though it is already somewhat frail for directors. 
 Our position, specifi cally for offi cers, would seek to preserve the key process/
substance distinction in the judicial review of due care. Courts should not second-
guess substantive business judgments of offi cers but they should—in what we be-
lieve will be those relatively rare cases reaching courts—examine process, bearing 
in mind the overall context in which a decision was made. Moreover, offi cers, like 
all agents, should be expected to act reasonably, not better and not worse. This 
seems to us especially important at a time of widespread disenchantment with 
the behavior of many corporate executives, both within and outside the corpo-
rate world. The simple aim is to preserve the ex ante power of due care to shape 
conduct and the ex post capacity to sanction misconduct. In addition, although 
we believe the default standard of care for offi cers is now and should remain ordi-
nary, “normally exercised” care, we believe too that corporations, via their boards, 
should be able to alter that standard by contract in specifi c cases. We would permit 
relaxing the standard to a gross negligence standard but no further, 110 recognizing 
we have little guidance as to whether, or how far, courts will permit contractual 
modifi cation of offi cer duties. We believe as well that this should not be done cat-
egorically for all offi cers in the certifi cate of incorporation or bylaws, but only on 
109. McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1274 (Del. Ch. 2008) (“Delaware’s current understand-
ing of gross negligence is conduct that constitutes reckless indifference or actions that are without the 
bounds of reason.”).
110. The Restatement ( Third) of Agency states that a “contract may . . . , in appropriate circum-
stances, raise or lower the standard” applicable to the duties of care, competence, and diligence, 
but the Restatement does not indicate whether those duties can be eliminated altogether. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 cmt. b (2006). Contracting around fi duciary duties for offi cers certainly 
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a case-by-case basis in individual employment agreements. This would permit a 
contractual relaxation to the default standard of care now applicable to directors, 111 
while retaining for offi cers a somewhat stricter default rule. We do not believe 
Delaware courts would sustain contractual restrictions on monetary liability, in 
light of the General Assembly’s decision in section 102(b)(7) to permit exculpation 
only for directors. 112 
 A fi nal point about the relationship between the fi duciary duties of directors 
and offi cers—and judicial review of those duties—is one that is often overlooked. 
Currently, the duty of loyalty for directors seems quite close to, if not identical 
with, the duty of loyalty owed by agents. 113 This outcome evolved haltingly, after a 
period of time when classic self-dealing transactions by directors potentially were 
voidable. 114 Now, the duty of loyalty in corporate law takes director confl icts quite 
seriously, as does agency law, which seems to have infl uenced the law of direc-
tor loyalty. Consequently, it is on the care front that director duties deviate from 
those of agency law. Bearing this in mind, the issue is not whether, generally, the 
fi duciary duties of directors and offi cers are or should be the same. In the loyalty 
area, they probably are the same and they are, essentially, the same as those of 
agents, even though directors are not agents. The issue, rather, is the narrower one 
of whether the duty of care for offi cers, who are agents, should similarly remain 
that applicable to agents generally or whether a convincing case can be made that, 
as with directors, only a looser standard of care should be demanded of offi cers. 
We should be clear, in other words, that the question of equivalent or divergent 
fi duciary standards for offi cers and directors is a live issue only with respect to the 
duty of care, although there are several dimensions to that issue. 115 
 VII.  LAW MUST ADDRESS OFFICER CONDUCT; 
DELAWARE AND/OR THE FEDS? 
 D elaware law on corporate offi cers remains surprisingly undeveloped. It is 
true, as noted in Part IV, that it is to be expected that there will be fewer cases 
“invites a question as to the propriety of one fi duciary, the board of directors, relaxing the obligations 
of another fi duciary, senior offi cers.” Johnson & Millon, supra note 4, at 1641; see also Aaron D. Jones, 
Corporate Offi cer Wrongdoing and the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Offi cers Under Delaware Law, 44 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 475, 484–518 (2007). Jones cites positive law limits on director discretion in negotiating 
offi cer employment agreements and present case law to conclude that directors may be prohibited 
from agreeing to limit the fi duciary duty obligations of an offi cer beyond the standards of liability for 
a director. Jones also concludes that any such exculpatory agreements with an offi cer cannot condone 
any payments or limitation of liability for bad faith misconduct by the offi cer.
111. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
112. See supra note 73.
113. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01–8.06 (2006) (specifying aspects of the duty of 
loyalty). Delaware law similarly prohibits directors from improper self-dealing, wrongly usurping cor-
porate opportunities, and improperly using confi dential information. See Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., 
Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 154–55 (Del. 1996) (corporate opportunity doctrine); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 
A.2d 400, 404 (Del. 1987) (self-dealing); Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1061–62 (Del. 
Ch. 2004), aff’d, 872 A.2d 559 (Del. 2005) (confi dential information).
114. Marciano, 535 A.2d at 404.
115. See supra note 75.
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brought (and adjudicated) against offi cers than against directors. But the lower 
number of cases does not itself explain why the law of offi cer fi duciary duties has 
not been, in those cases that were brought, articulated more fully.  Gantler was 
decided only two years ago, and it left open several important issues. 116 With 
its jurisdiction statute now reaching offi cers, 117 it appears that Delaware judges 
are inviting the bar to help them address and resolve these open questions. 118 
Although we expect there will continue to be far fewer reported cases involving 
offi cers than directors due to intra-corporate resolutions for the former, judicial 
articulation of the law still matters, both for the cases that do proceed (in and 
out of Delaware courts) and to permit counsel to advise offi cers about legal stan-
dards concerning their conduct ex ante. Consequently, this is an opportunity for 
Delaware to write law on a less cluttered, if not blank, legal slate. 119 This is why, 
although we quite pointedly disagree with him, we welcome Mr. Graf’s voice to 
the state law conversation. Judges, lawyers (litigators and planners), and corpo-
rate law scholars should continue to enrich this discussion. Corporate offi cers are 
too central to corporate governance to simply unthinkingly “default” their duties 
to those of corporate directors, as opposed to developing more affi rmative bases 
for why offi cer duties should be the same as or, as we believe, different from, those 
of directors. 
 In the meantime, the non-criminal sanctioning of offi cers may be taking place 
in federal bankruptcy courts with respect to fi duciary duties and, more gener-
ally, by the SEC. The SEC has a broad arsenal of sanctions it can bring to bear 
against offi cer misconduct, including civil monetary penalties, 120 cease and desist 
116. See id.
117. Delaware’s statute did not give the Delaware Court of Chancery personal jurisdiction over 
offi cers until January 1, 2004. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114(b) (1999 & Supp. 2010) (“Every non-
resident of this State who after January 1, 2004 accepts election or appointment as an offi cer . . . .”).
118. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 777 n.588 (Del. Ch. 2005) 
(“The parties essentially treat both offi cers and directors as comparable fi duciaries, that is, subject to 
the same fi duciary duties and standards of review. Thus, for purposes of this case, theories of liability 
against corporate directors apply equally to corporate offi cers, making further distinctions unneces-
sary.”); Hampshire Grp., Ltd. v. Kuttner, C.A. No. 3607-VCS, 2010 WL 2739995, at *11 (Del. Ch. 
July 12, 2010) (“Generally, like directors, [offi cers] Clayton and Clark were expected . . . to use the 
amount of care a reasonably prudent person would use in similar circumstances (i.e., to fulfi ll their 
duty of care).”).
119. This will also present an opportunity to revisit the awkward business judgment rule frame-
work that began in the early 1990s in the Cede litigation. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 
345, 361 (Del. 1993). There, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a breach of the duty of care for 
directors leads not to liability but to a shift of the burden of proof such that directors must prove 
entire fairness. There is no reason for such an analytical construct in the duty of care context. In-
stead, a breach of the duty of care should be the end of the liability analysis, with the remaining issue 
being whether the breach caused monetary damage or warrants another remedy. See generally Lyman 
Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 787 (1999) (criticizing Cede 
framework). The more straightforward framework should be adopted by Delaware courts for offi cers 
from the outset and, in addition, should be adopted for directors in place of the current, unnecessarily 
prolix Cede construct.
120. See Securities Act of 1933 [hereinafter 1933 Act] § 20(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d) (2006 & Supp. IV 
2010); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter 1934 Act] § 21A(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(d)(3) 
(2006).
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orders, 121 and barring wrongdoers from further service as an offi cer or director of 
a reporting company. 122 
 Financial fraud cases by the SEC are usually brought against the company and 
its offi cers. 123 Few cases are brought against directors, 124 though recently that 
agency has targeted certain outside directors in two actions. 125 This is the mirror 
opposite of litigation under Delaware corporate law, where there are numerous 
cases against directors and far fewer against offi cers. 126 Many SEC cases brought 
against offi cers concern the usual fare of intentional fi nancial fraud, at least at the 
charging stage. 127 Frequently, however, it appears that many cases are resolved on 
negligence grounds, for example, under sections 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities 
Act of 1933, rather than on scienter-based counts. 128 
 In 2010, to illustrate, in separate actions against Dell Computer Corp. and 
several of its offi cers and against Citigroup, the SEC obtained consent decrees 
under such a negligent fraud theory. 129 One commentator recently has described 
these initiatives as the SEC’s effort to develop a federal “ Caremark duty” to monitor 
under the federal securities laws, generally aimed at offi cers. 130 The SEC also has 
targeted related party transactions and has used the clawback provisions under 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to “claw back” incentive compensation, even where the 
offi cer was not involved in the underlying fraud. 131 
 The point here is not to assess the merits or demerits of the SEC’s strategy. The 
point simply is that the current legal action against corporate offi cers is at the 
federal level, not the state level. This is a less noticed version of the creeping “fed-
eralization” of corporate lawmaking than that seen in the corporate law-related 
provisions of the landmark Dodd-Frank legislation. 132 This has resulted not from 
121. See 1933 Act § 8A, 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (2006); 1934 Act § 21C, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (2006 & 
Supp. IV 2010).
122. See 1933 Act § 20(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) (2006); 1934 Act § 21C(f ), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(f ) 
(2006).
123. Thomas O. Gorman, Trends in SEC Financial Fraud Actions: Part I, LAW 360 (Apr. 29, 2011, 
2:13 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/242098/section=securities.
124. Id.
125. Matteo Tonello, SEC Enforcement Actions Against Outside Directors Remind Boards, HARV. L. SCH. 
FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. ( July 16, 2011, 11:01 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2011/07/16/sec-enforcement-actions-against-outside-directors-offer-reminder-for-boards.
126. Johnson & Garvis, supra note 3, at 1106–08.




130. Id.; see In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–70 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(director duty to monitor).
131. Gorman, Trends in SEC Financial Fraud Actions: Part II, supra note 127.
132. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (the “Dodd-Frank Act”). Professors Robert Thompson and Hillary Sale have noted this 
trend as well but emphasize the absence of state law. Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities 
Fraud as Corporate Governance: Refl ections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 905–06 (2003). We 
emphasize here, as before, see Johnson & Millon, supra note 4, that agency law long has supplied a 
body of law applicable to corporate offi cers but that courts have not fully or extensively articulated 
legal concepts for offi cers in a way that differentiates offi cers (and their duties) from directors.
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express disenchantment with state corporate law as such, but from that body 
of law’s sustained and outright neglect of offi cer conduct. Even though they see 
fewer offi cer cases than director cases, we do agree with Mr. Graf that it is “simply 
a matter of time” before Delaware courts must resolve the open issues associated 
with offi cer wrongdoing. 133 When they do so, we hope they craft the law of offi cer 
duties in a way that, while realistic, also provides meaningful accountability along 
the lines advocated here and in earlier work. 
133. Graf, supra note 1, at 315.
